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ABSTRACT | In this article, disputes over the identification of persisting “legacies” of the past that participate 
in the constitution of present patterns of organized violence are discussed. It highlights the ways in which 
present forms of organized violence are often tied to past experiences of political violence in the context of 
transitional justice discourse, as serious contemporary human rights violations are framed as indicators of 
the failure of past transitional processes. This article then explores such disputes in the context of recent civil 
society debates in Mexico on the potential development of transitional justice mechanisms; and in the context 
of the Sub commission of Truth in Democracy “Mothers of Acari” in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
K E Y WO R D S  | Brazil; legacies; Mexico; organized violence; transitional justice
Desenredando legados violentos: violencia contemporánea organizada en América Latina y la narrativa de 
la “transición fallida”
RESUMEN | En este artículo se discuten las disputas sobre la identificación de los “legados” persistentes del pasado 
que participan en la constitución de los patrones presentes de violencia organizada. Resalta cómo las formas 
presentes de violencia organizada a menudo se vinculan con experiencias pasadas de violencia política en el 
contexto del discurso de justicia transicional, ya que las violaciones contemporáneas a los derechos humanos 
se enmarcan como indicadores del fracaso de pasados procesos transicionales. El artículo luego explora dichas 
disputas en el contexto de los debates recientes de la sociedad civil, en México, sobre el potencial desarrollo 
de mecanismos de justicia transicional; y en el contexto de la subcomisión de Verdad en Democracia “Madres de 
Acari”, en Rio de Janeiro, Brasil.
PA L A B R A S  C L AV E  | Brasil; justicia transicional; legados; México; violencia organizada
Desatando legados violentos: a violência contemporânea organizada na América Latina e a narrativa  
da “transição fracassada”
RESUMO | Neste artigo, são discutidas as disputas sobre a identificação dos “legados” persistentes do passado 
que participam da constituição dos padrões atuais de violência organizada. Ressalta-se como as formas 
presentes de violência organizada com frequência são vinculadas a experiências passadas de violência política 
no contexto do discurso de justiça de transição, já que as violações contemporâneas dos direitos humanos 
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On September 14, 2018, the Mexican president-elect 
Andrés Manuel López Obrador (often referred to as 
AMLO) participated in an event on the perspectives for 
transitional justice in the country, the Second Dialogue 
for Peace, Truth and Justice. The event, held by the 
National Human Rights Commission alongside other 
agencies, universities and civil society organizations, 
took place at a cultural center in Tlatelolco, the same 
square in Mexico City where, in 1968, the armed forces 
opened fire against hundreds of unarmed civilians at a 
protest, turning it into a massacre that is considered 
part of the country’s “Dirty War.” This fact was men-
tioned in one of the opening speeches, by the poet Javier 
Sicilia, who created the Movement for Peace with Jus-
tice and Dignity (MPJD) in 2011 after the murder of his 
young son. According to Sicilia,
That massacre, the 1968 one, also plagued with 
disappearances, and which marked the 20th centu-
ry, was poorly acknowledged by the government 
of the wrongly called democratic transition, the 
truncated and sloppy truth process of the Special 
Prosecutor’s Office for Social and Political Move-
ments of the Past (FEMOSPP), created by Vicente 
Fox. It has led to theimpunity and forgetting that, in 
the 21st century, condemned us to repeat violence 
in a much more terrible and atrocious manner. 
(CNDH 2018)
Over a thousand victims and family members went to 
the Tlatelolco cultural center that day (Zavala 2018), 
having been invited to prepare presentations on the 
need for a transitional justice strategy. As they were 
given the floor, however, many victims went beyond the 
planned “script” and started to express their personal 
experience, asking AMLO to find their own loved ones, 
their children, their husbands. As organizers attempted 
to calm the audience, a little girl climbed up on the stage 
and sat by AMLO’s side, holding a sign with a picture 
of her disappeared father. Finally, López Obrador took 
the microphone and hesitantly started to say that he 
had listened to their suffering; but he then went on to 
“explain” the causes of their suffering. In his words:
All these things that have unfortunately taken 
place have an explanation. I will not go into the 
background theme, but I will just say that violence 
in Mexico has taken place because, since 1983, 
the country has chosen an economic model called 
neoliberal but which is, in fact, neoporfirismo. […] 
This is what has originated all of this pain and all 
of this violence. (“Presidente electo se reúne con 
familiares” 2018)
AMLO then said that his government would fix it. He 
would provide education and jobs, and he would create a 
scholarship program for their children —to which a voice 
in the crowd screamed “our children are disappeared!” 
Eventually, the Mexican president claimed that, while he 
believed in the importance of forgiveness, he understood 
that what those victims were asking for was justice; 
and that his Secretary of Interior would thus guarantee 
that justice would be provided to them (CNDH 2018).1
Months later, on December 10, 2018, in the Brazilian city 
of Rio de Janeiro, the state’s Legislature held a special 
session dedicated to the International Human Rights 
Day. At the event, civil society activists spoke about the 
challenges they would likely face in the coming years, 
not only due to the election of a president who opposes 
human rights and denies that a dictatorship has taken 
place in Brazil, but also due to the election of a state 
governor who had said that his solution for crime would 
be to have snipers aim at the heads of “bandits” holding 
rifles and shoot.
As part of that session, the final report of the Sub 
commission of Truth in Democracy “Mothers of Acari” was 
first presented to the public. Two of the Sub commission’s 
researchers presented their findings on patterns of torture 
and forced disappearance perpetrated by state agents and 
related actors between 1988 and 2018, in the State of Rio 
de Janeiro. Both accounts emphasized the distribution of 
these violations across Rio’s population which, by mainly 
targeting the bodies of young black men, revealed the 
institutionalized racism that grounds Rio’s judicial and 
security apparatus.
Their presentation was followed by speeches of the Sub 
commission’s partners. One of them, representing the 
Ford Foundation, praised the Sub commission’s findings 
and reinforced the central place of structural racism in 
their composition. But she also noted that such initiatives 
for memory, truth and justice were needed in Brazil due 
1 Footage of the event is available at CNDH (2018). Parts of this story 
were also told to me at an interview with Mariclaire Acosta, at 
Mexico City, in April 2019.
são definidas como indicadores do fracasso de passados processos de transição. Logo, o artigo explora essas 
disputas no contexto dos debates recentes da sociedade civil, no México, sobre o potencial desenvolvimento de 
mecanismos de justiça de transição, e no contexto da Subcomissão da Verdade na Democracia “Mães de Acari”, 
no Rio de Janeiro, Brasil.
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to the existing “democratic deficit in our country, which 
has not yet provided justice to the families of those exe-
cuted and disappeared or to the political prisoners of 
the civil-military dictatorship, and which continues to 
endorse atrocities and impunities perpetrated by state 
institutions and agencies in the favelas, in prisons and in 
rural conflicts” (TV ALERJ 2018).
Both events are illustrative of how different actors 
make sense of present patterns of organized violence, 
often, but not necessarily, by articulating connec-
tions between these patterns and particular points in 
the past, which persist in the form of legacies. At the 
Second Dialogue for Peace, Truth and Justice in Mexico 
City, much of the incoherence in the interaction among 
the actors involved stemmed from the different ways in 
which they make sense of present violence, connecting 
it (or not) to past events and structures. Firstly, human 
rights and transitional justice activists had decided to 
hold the event at a place that symbolized past state vio-
lence perpetrated in the name of counterinsurgency. 
Secondly, certain victims’ movements did not necessar-
ily identify with a holistic transitional justice agenda 
—particularly in the case of certain family members of 
disappeared persons, for whom the priority are search 
efforts— and might thus be less inclined to situate the 
causes of their suffering in the country’s past. Finally, 
AMLO’s effort to trace victims’ needs to a legacy of 
neoliberalism would foreground solutions from the 
field of socioeconomic policy —which, while probably 
perceived as appropriate in other settings, seemed out 
of sync with the expectations of either human rights 
experts and activists or victims’ collectives.
The presentation of the Sub commission of Truth in 
Democracy’s final report in Rio de Janeiro, in turn, 
illustrates the need to account for a multiplicity of “leg-
acies” which participate in the composition of present 
patterns of organized violence. On the one hand, the 
Sub commission arose amidst a proliferation of truth 
initiatives regarding past political violence, and it sought 
to account for connections between present human 
rights violations and a past of state repression under the 
Brazilian military dictatorship. On the other hand, it also 
needed to account for legacies of racism, which must be 
traced much further back into Brazilian history.
Therefore, these events illustrate disputes that arise 
from an understanding of present violence in vari-
ous Latin American contexts as an effect of persisting 
legacies of past violence, which have not been prop-
erly confronted and overcome. Those disputes will 
be further explored in this article, with an emphasis 
on what it means to read present forms of organized 
violence —especially when perpetrated by state agents 
in the name of a “war on crime”— in connection with 
past experiences of political violence, as often noted in 
the discourse of human rights experts. It is argued here 
that this emphasis on the legacies of the past which 
participate in the composition of present violence favors 
a particular set of prescriptions and initiatives for the 
transformation of these patterns —namely those asso-
ciated with the field of transitional justice.
The notion of transitional justice commonly refers to 
mechanisms through which serious human rights vio-
lations perpetrated in the past are handled, in order to 
guarantee victims’ rights to truth, justice, reparations 
and non-repetition. A more specific understanding 
within that field is of interest for this article: the “failed 
transition” narrative, that is, the construction of present 
patterns of serious human rights violations as indicators 
of the failure of past transitional justice efforts, which 
would in a sense condemn a society to the repetition 
of those violations. Over the last few decades, this 
narrative has been mobilized in many Latin American 
contexts, as the signature of peace agreements or the 
adoption of democratic constitutions gave way to recon-
figurations of organized violence, perpetrated by state 
and non-state actors, rather than the peace that had been 
foreseen. As a result, a growing number of actors now 
turn to transitional justice mechanisms as a source of 
answers for the transformation of present violence, to 
the extent that it is allegedly connected to the persisting 
legacies of the past. However, as will be discussed in 
this article, the entanglement between ruptures and 
continuities in the (re)production of present violence 
leads to a rearticulation of the field of transitional jus-
tice itself, favoring a more nuanced understanding of 
“transition” that blurs the distinctions between past, 
present, and future that have traditionally grounded 
these practices.
After exploring these arguments in the next section, 
this article will discuss contemporary political disputes 
in Mexico and Brazil which illustrate the tensions aris-
ing from the act of identifying “legacies” that connect 
present and past patterns of organized violence. In both 
countries, there have been recent efforts to establish 
transitional justice mechanisms, such as truth com-
missions, devoted to present serious human rights 
violations; and in both contexts, these initiatives have 
been premised on the view that previous transitional 
justice attempts, focused on past patterns of state ter-
ror, had failed to promote the transformation of their 
legacies; that is, their “non-repetition.” Therefore, these 
cases illustrate some of the challenges that arise from 
attempts to draw from the transitional justice toolkit in 
order to “deal with the present,” after a perceived failure 
to “deal with the past,” or to overcome its “legacies.” In 
the Mexican context, I will explore recent civil society 
debates about the development of transitional justice 
mechanisms during the presidential transition in 2018 
and 2019, highlighting the place of the idea of a “lega-
cy” of impunity in these debates; while in Brazil, I will 
specifically analyze the experience of the Sub commis-
sion of Truth in Democracy “Mothers of Acari” in Rio 
de Janeiro, as it sought to account for the entanglement 
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among different “legacies” in the composition of pres-
ent violence. The analysis of these stories is grounded 
in documentary research, on the analysis of footage on 
public events available in online media and on interviews 
with experts and activists on the field.
Violent Legacies as Transitional Justice 
“Failures”
The concept of “legacy” is commonly used to refer to 
that which is transmitted from the past into the pres-
ent. An estate that is left by a parent to their children in 
a will, the lessons written down by an ancient philoso-
pher and inherited by future generations, the memory 
of human rights violations committed in a past war, or 
the contemporary structures of inequality which can 
be traced back to colonial rule are a few examples of the 
sorts of contexts where the idea of “legacy” is usually 
deployed (see The Merriam-Webster Dictionary 2020). 
It evokes the image of that which is somehow inherited 
over time; or of that which remains from the past.
Therefore, the idea of legacy speaks of the relationship 
between present and past. Introducing a revisited edi-
tion of his classic The Past is a Foreign Country, David 
Lowenthal claims that “The past is everywhere. All 
around us lie features with more or less familiar 
antecedents. Relics, histories, memories suffuse human 
experience” (2015, 1). That is not to deny the possibility 
of transformation; as noted by Lowenthal, while “the 
whole of the past is our legacy,” it is also true that “our 
legacy, divine and diabolical alike, is not set in stone but 
simmers in the incipient flux of time. Far from inert-
ly ending, the ongoing past absorbs our own creative 
agency, replenishing that of countless precursors” 
(2015, 610).
In this article, in turn, I mobilize the image of a legacy as 
a thread, which is actively extended over time in order to 
connect particular points in the present and in the past, 
rather than as a layer of relics or residues. That is, instead 
of emphasizing the accumulation of what remains from 
the past, I wish to focus on the act of connecting past and 
present as if there were a transmission between those 
points, while the legacy is the thread that enacts this 
connection. That image allows us to understand how 
multiple threads can be pulled by different actors over 
time, in order to emphasize different causalities in the 
production of present violence; and it also allows us to 
analyze the entanglement among different threads. As 
will be discussed below, in the field of transitional justice, 
and especially in various Latin American contexts, the 
thread of legacy is extended over time in a particular 
way: present configurations of criminal violence, or of 
state violence perpetrated in the name of “wars on crime,” 
are often presented as partly resulting from a legacy of 
past forms of past violence, which has not been properly 
overcome by transitional justice efforts.
“Coming to Terms” with Legacies of Past Violence
In the field of transitional justice, the notion of “lega-
cy” is often deployed with a more particular role. For 
instance, according to a report published by the United 
Nations Secretary-General in 2004, the notion of “tran-
sitional justice” comprises:
[…] the full range of processes and mechanisms asso-
ciated with a society’s attempts to come to terms 
with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to 
ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve 
reconciliation. These may include both judicial and 
non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of 
international involvement (or none at all) and indi-
vidual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, 
institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a 
combination thereof. (UN Secretary-General 2004, 
paragraph 8; emphasis added)
This understanding of the relationship between tran-
sitional justice and violent legacies is reinforced in a 
report published in 2012 by the Special Rapporteur on 
the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guar-
antees of non-recurrence, Pablo de Greiff, where he 
claims to take “the four components of the mandate, 
truth, justice, reparations and guarantees of non-recur-
rence as a set of measures that are related to, and can 
reinforce, one another, when implemented to redress 
the legacies of massive human rights violations and abus-
es” (UNHRC 2012, paragraph 21; emphasis added).
These definitions of transitional justice place the idea of 
the “legacy” of human rights abuses as the main problem 
these mechanisms seek to “fix” or “redress.” This idea 
of overcoming legacies of past violence is inseparable 
from a broader narrative of transition: beginning in the 
tragedy of large-scale affliction, it aims to move a society 
towards a redemptive resolution in the form of peace 
and reconciliation; and the production of greater soci-
etal self-knowledge in the form of a collectively shared 
historical truth is represented as a crucial step along the 
way (Teitel 2014, 106-107). According to Castillejo Cuellar 
(2017), this notion of transitional justice, along with the 
network of legal and extralegal practices associated with 
the term, is thus based on at least two premises: firstly, 
the “promise” or “prospect” of a “new imagined nation”; 
and secondly, the very possibility of assigning violence 
a place “behind,” by having it contained in the “past.” In 
other words, according to the “promise” of transitional 
justice, as a society moves forward, violence should be 
left behind, while the present is conceived as a limin-
al moment; and truth commissions have a particularly 
central role in the production of this fracture between a 
“violent past” and a “coming future.”
The implied consequence of this narrative is that 
when a society fails to come to terms with its past, it 
will be haunted by violent legacies in the present. This 
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perspective is at the core of the global emergence of the 
legacies of past atrocities as a political issue, whether 
these legacies are defined in terms of structural factors 
that perpetuate violence, or in the form of persisting 
grievances among those who have been victimized (see 
Bevernage 2011, 13). As will be discussed below, in Lat-
in America, the emergence of new patterns of human 
rights violations has often been read in relation to a 
sense that transitional justice processes in the region 
have been incomplete, thereby identifying present 
forms of organized violence with the “failure” to fully 
overcome the legacies of past political violence.
Violent “Legacies” in Latin America
Since the 1980s, Latin America has played an important 
role in the emergence of a global field of transitional 
justice. Initially, that role was connected with the 
experiences of democratic transition in the Southern 
Cone and with peace processes in Central America (see 
Fuentes Julio 2015, 7-8). In the 2000s, the process of 
dealing with past human rights abuses under authori-
tarian regimes and civil wars in Latin America has been 
reinvigorated, through the establishment of new truth 
commissions, trials and reparations policies, amongst 
other mechanisms. On the one hand, these develop-
ments were connected to a global trend, namely the 
upsurge of a culture of memory and of human rights 
accountability mechanisms. On the other, regional 
factors have also been crucial, including a sense of dis-
satisfaction with how past violence had been handled 
in post-authoritarian/post-conflict settings, especially 
among victims’ families; as well as a generalized sense 
of distrust in government and law enforcement insti-
tutions, fueled by economic inequality and mounting 
violence (Villalon 2017).
Thus, in the 2000s, a rise in violence levels, coupled with 
a sense that transitional justice processes in the region 
had been “incomplete,” favored the understanding that 
we were witnessing the legacies of previous contexts 
of dictatorship or armed conflicts. This perspective is 
reflected in a large body of recent literature devoted to 
what remains of past dictatorships and conflicts in the 
region, including their impacts on the present power of 
military institutions, on patterns of arbitrary practices 
and illegal violence perpetrated by state agents, and 
on the weakness of judicial institutions, for instance 
(e.g., Esparza 2015; Schneider and Esparza 2015; Hite 
and Cesarini 2004). Aside from the recent establish-
ment of memory, truth and justice initiatives dedicated 
to past violations, this context has also given rise to 
mechanisms which, while inspired by experiences of 
transitional justice in the region, focused their attention 
on present human rights violations. In these cases, there 
is often an emphasis on the connections between pres-
ent forms of criminal violence, or of state violence 
committed in “wars on crime” and past contexts of 
political violence, which past transitional justice efforts 
have “failed” to properly handle. These contexts have 
also given rise to discussions on what it means to speak 
of transitional justice in contemporary contexts where 
no clear “transition” is in sight (see Uprimny Yepes and 
Saffon Sanín 2006; Saffon 2019). In these settings, the 
present is still reinstated as a liminal place that holds 
the promise of a transformed future, but the impos-
sibility of distinguishing a clear-cut “fracture” makes 
room for closer attention to be paid to the structures 
that sustain violence over time.
In these efforts to “deal with the present,” the idea of 
“legacies” arguably rescues the transitional justice 
paradigm in the face of persisting violence, reframing 
present patterns as a result of failed efforts to contain 
violence in the “past.” However, by retaining the “prom-
ise” of transitional justice in the form of a new rupture 
—this time, the rupture with the persisting legacies of 
the past— this narrative runs the risk of dismissing the 
dialectics of change and continuity that underlies the 
human experience. As noted by Alejandro Castillejo 
Cuellar (2017), accounting for these dialectics requires 
attention to be paid to the historicity of the transition-
al, while expanding collective debates on the various 
registers of war, some of which are more properly 
conceived as part of a much longer continuum of vio-
lence that blurs distinctions between “war” and “peace” 
or “dictatorship” and “democracy.” In other words, a 
critical approach to the notion of transition leads to 
an awareness of the entanglement between historical 
shifts and continuities, including the place of structural 
factors, such as economic inequality and exploitation, in 
the emergence and perpetuation of violence. Therefore, 
the articulation of “legacies” as threads that connect 
present phenomena and past causes is constantly sub-
jected to challenges that range from the existence of 
multiple entangled legacies in the production of present 
violence, to the persistence of structural factors that 
are to be found in the present as much as in the past. 
Accounting for these entanglements is one of the main 
challenges posed for activists and experts that bring the 
field of “transitional justice” to bear on present patterns 
of human rights violations.
The next sections will discuss some of the mechanisms 
which, inspired by the field of transitional justice, have 
been designed in Latin America as a means to trans-
form present patterns of human rights violations. They 
will also illustrate the tensions that arise from these 
initiatives, including the need to handle the multiple 
“legacies” that constitute present configurations of 
organized violence, as well as the structural continu-
ities that challenge the centrality of the past in reading 
and transforming present violence. Besides, the follow-
ing stories also demonstrate some of the ways through 
which the field of transitional justice practices is being 
rearticulated in order to account for patterns of human 
rights violations which cannot be readily translated 
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into its traditionally assumed teleology. In other words, 
while extending the thread of “legacy” in order to 
connect present violence and past “failed” transitional 
justice attempts, activists and experts are also rework-
ing the premises of this field.
Legacies of Impunity: Connecting the Present 
“War on Drugs” and the Past “Dirty War”  
in Mexico’s Transitional Justice Debate
In July 2018, a few weeks after the results of presiden-
tial elections in Mexico, the Platform Against Impunity 
and Corruption, a collective made up of national and 
international human rights organizations, anticor-
ruption organizations, scholars, journalists and other 
activists, whose creation was led by the Mexican Insti-
tute of Human Rights and Democracy (IMDHD) presented 
a proposal for the implementation of a Truth and Histor-
ical Memory Commission for Mexico to the public.
In this first version, the proposed Truth Commission 
would focus on clarifying the serious human rights 
violations committed in the context of the “war against 
drug trafficking” in the country since December 2006. 
Presenting the proposal on July 24, 2018, Guillermo 
Trejo —a member of the Platform who had a central role 
in its formulation— noted: “In 2000, we had a histori-
cal opportunity, and a transitional justice was aborted, 
which partly explains the long night of violence in which 
we are still entrapped. We shall not waste the historical 
opportunity we have right now” (IMDHD 2018).
The “aborted” transitional justice effort to which Trejo 
referred was the Special Prosecutor’s Office for Political 
and Social Movements from the Past (FEMOSPP). It was 
established in the early 2000s by Mexican president 
Vicente Fox, after a long period of one-party rule. Its 
aim was to account for human rights violations per-
petrated in the 1960s and 1970s during the country’s 
“Dirty War,” particularly the forced disappearance 
and execution of political oppositionists from armed 
movements and of students, including those involved 
in the Tlatelolco massacre in 1968. The FEMOSPP was 
shut down in 2007 without publishing an official report 
—a document on those violations was eventually leaked, 
but it was never officially recognized and allegedly rep-
resents only the position of its authors. Besides, no state 
officials were convicted for past violations, and no 
reparations program was established at the time when 
FEMOSPP ended (Ansolabehere 2019).
Presenting the first version of a truth commission pro-
posal in 2018, Trejo highlighted that, while there were 
clear connections between the violations committed 
in the past and those of the present, this Commission 
should be a trigger for other mechanisms focused on 
contexts such as the country’s guerra sucia, as han-
dling all of them at the same might jeopardize the 
Commission’s effectiveness. However, a second version 
of the proposal, released months later after extensive 
consultations with national and international human 
rights experts and organizations, requested a two-fold 
temporal mandate. It would seek to account for serious 
human rights violations perpetrated in the country in 
two periods: between January 1, 1965 and November 30, 
2006, and between December 1, 2006 and the present. 
The aim was to, on the one hand, shed light on viola-
tions committed both in the country’s war on drugs 
and in the context of state repression against political 
opponents; and, on the other, “to analyze the potential 
links between practices and actors of political violence 
in the past and of criminal violence in more recent 
times” (CMDPDH 2019).
What was at stake was the place of the past in attempts 
to make sense of the present. While the first proposal 
already entailed a perception that the failure to con-
front past violations was connected to the emergence 
of contemporary patterns of violence, the “legacies” 
of this failure became even more centralized after the 
debates and processes that led to its second version. 
While the proposal concerns the creation of a mecha-
nism dedicated to violations perpetrated in the present, 
it is still enmeshed in the temporal imagination that 
grounds the field of transitional justice. However, the 
nature of these legacies, as well as the place they should 
have in mechanisms that seek to transform present 
patterns of human rights violations, have been the sub-
ject of important disputes, as will be discussed below.
Transitional Justice Debates Regarding Mexico’s 
“War on Drugs”
The onset of the temporal scope of the truth commis-
sion in its first proposal is December 1, 2006, a date that 
is often quoted as the beginning of a “war on drugs” in 
Mexico. That was when Felipe Calderón took office as 
Mexican president (2006-2012). Days later, he ordered 
the deployment of thousands of Army soldiers in the 
Mexican state of Michoacán, in what was considered a 
declaration of war against drug cartels (Espino 2019).
While Mexico had faced conflicts over the control of drug 
routes since the end of the 1980s, that moment in 2006 
marked an inflection in terms of the subsequent focus 
on militarized strategies against organized crime. Since 
then, the country has faced a drastic increase in various 
forms of violence, including homicides and forced disap-
pearances, stemming from confrontations between state 
forces and organized criminal groups, as well as amongst 
criminal groups themselves. As a result, between 2007 
and April 2018, over 130 thousand people were murdered, 
over 33 thousand were forcibly disappeared, bodies have 
been found in over a thousand clandestine grave sites, 
thousands of persons have been victimized in collective 
massacres, and hundreds of journalists, mayors, local 
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politicians and religious leaders have been executed by 
state agents and by members of criminal organizations, 
whether in confrontation or in collusion with each other 
(Grupo Verdad y Memoria-Plataforma Contra la Impuni-
dad y la Corrupción 2018).
Over the last few years in Mexico, certain civil society 
organizations have felt that their traditional strategies to 
promote human rights —such as advocacy and strategic 
litigation— were limited in the face of rising levels of 
violations in the country. They thus began to develop 
proposals for the creation of exceptional mechanisms 
inspired by the experience of transitional justice process-
es in Latin America. One of them, the proposal of a Truth 
Commission, was developed by the Platform Against 
Impunity and Corruption after studies about experiences 
of truth commissions in countries such as Peru, Argen-
tina, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador and Guatemala, as well 
as about past transitional justice attempts in Mexico —
especially the FEMOSPP and the local truth commissions 
established in the states of Guerrero and Oaxaca, also 
related to human rights violations committed by state 
agents in the 1960s-70s (Interview with Edgar Cortés, 
IMDHD, Mexico City, April 2019).
In 2018, presidential elections provided a window of 
opportunity for discussions on potential transitional jus-
tice mechanisms. This was particularly true after AMLO, 
in his presidential campaign, declared in December 
2017, that he intended to provide amnesties as part of 
a pacification program for the country —an unclear and 
controversial proposal, which was confronted by victims 
who asked for “neither forgiveness, nor forgetting” (ni 
perdón, ni olvido) (“¿Amnistía a líderes de cárteles?” 2017). 
In response to this resistance, AMLO’s campaign team 
reframed the proposal of amnesties as “part of a com-
prehensive peacebuilding strategy under the transitional 
justice framework in order to close the cycle of war and 
violence” (Ortiz Ahlf 2018). In May 2018, the National 
Human Rights Commission (CNDH) and the Movement 
for Peace with Justice and Dignity (MPJD) held the first 
Dialogue for Peace and Justice, where AMLO, amongst 
other presidential candidates, expressed support for 
various transitional justice policies (“AMLO dice sí” 2018).
In July 2018, López Obrador won the presidential elec-
tions, which prompted civil society organizations to 
demand the fulfillment of his previous promises regard-
ing the transitional justice agenda. In September 2018, as 
mentioned in the introduction of this article, the Second 
Dialogue was held at the Tlatelolco Square. Following this, 
as part of the presidential transition, AMLO established 
six working sessions (mesas de trabajo) to further develop 
transitional justice proposals. Meeting in Mexico City, the 
sessions brought together activists from human rights 
organizations, victims’ groups from the capital and from 
other states, scholars, and national and international 
experts (Dayán 2019; Arteta 2019).
At the working session on the creation of a Truth Com-
mission, the first proposal presented by the Platform was 
subjected to further debates and inputs including a wider 
set of victims’ groups, as well as a number of national 
and foreign transitional justice experts (Grupo Verdad y 
Memoria-Plataforma Contra la Impunidad y la Corrup-
ción 2019). According to Edgar Cortés, a member of the 
Platform, during these debates it soon became clear to 
those activists and scholars that “one cannot explain the 
current criminal violence without somehow explaining 
or understanding the political violence that precedes it 
and that enmeshed with it over time” (Interview with 
Edgar Cortés, IMDHD, Mexico City, April 2019). Similarly, 
according to Luis Daniel Vazquez (FLACSO-México), who 
also participated in the transitional justice working ses-
sions, “[f]or us it is clear that present patterns of violence 
have their explanation in the past, some of them in the 
country’s Dirty War; most of them, also in the regional 
histories of each federative entity […]. We know we have 
to draw connections, that we would have to investigate 
because after all they are still victims, and victims 
deserve this right to truth and justice” (Interview with 
Luis Daniel Vazquez, FLACSO-México, Mexico City, April 
2019). As previously mentioned, after months of discus-
sions, a second version of the proposal was brought to 
the public in January 2019, with a two-fold temporal 
frame which aimed to identify connections between 
the present and past cycles of violence in the country.
Ultimately, however, the transitional justice agenda has 
been progressively emptied by AMLO’s administration. 
After meeting with the parents of 43 students who 
were forcibly disappeared in Ayotzinapa in 2014, the 
Mexican president created a Presidential Commission 
for Truth and Access to Justice in the Ayotzinapa case 
(Gobierno de México 2019) and expressed his commit-
ment to strengthen search mechanisms (Sheridan 2019). 
However, since the working session in 2018, AMLO’s 
administration progressively abandoned discussions 
about broader transitional justice mechanisms and, as a 
result, the Truth Commission proposal described above 
has remained largely limited to civil society debates. 
Moreover, going against promises made in his campaign, 
AMLO deepened the militarization of the country’s 
security strategy through the creation of a National 
Guard under military command, which, according to 
many human rights activists in the country, effectively 
neutralizes any possibility of a meaningful “transition” 
(Dayán 2019; Arteta 2019).
A Legacy of Impunity
As illustrated above, the idea that making sense of 
present patterns of organized violence requires us to 
observe their connections with the past has been at the 
center of transitional justice discussions in the country, 
becoming increasingly explicit in proposals for a Truth 
Commission. As we look at the particular content that 
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is attributed to these connections, the place of “impu-
nity” is particularly central; and the failure of FEMOSPP 
to handle past human rights violations is taken to be 
part of this history of continuous impunity. This idea is 
reflected in the 2019 version of the truth commission 
proposal, which claims to be part of an “anti-impunity 
package” (Grupo Verdad y Memoria-Plataforma Contra 
la Impunidad y la Corrupción 2019).
Jacobo Dayán, who coordinated the transitional justice 
working groups in 2018, holds a similar view. According 
to him, the recognition of the links between violations 
committed in the country’s Dirty War and present 
patterns of violence is widespread across civil society 
organizations, including the continuity between pat-
terns of impunity then and now. In this regard, Dayán 
claims that
If Mexico had gone through even a halfway com-
plete transitional process, we would now have 
institutions focusing on the search of missing 
persons. […] We would have institutions we do not 
have today. If recommendations had been made to 
the General Prosecutors Office for a reform of the 
judicial apparatus, if protocols on the use of force 
had been designed, if there had been reforms in the 
country’s Armed Forces, if there had been a repara-
tions model […] today we would have the institutions 
and the legal framework that we decided not to have, 
because we decided not to do anything. (Interview 
with Jacobo Dayán, Universidade Iberoamericana, 
Mexico City, April 2019)
However, the issue of “impunity” may be conceived 
in multiple ways, not all of which are consistent 
with a transitional justice narrative and strategy. In 
this regard, it should be noted that not all victims’ 
movements were equally supportive of the idea of 
establishing these sorts of transitional justice mech-
anisms. There has been some resistance by certain 
family members of forcibly disappeared persons, for 
instance, who were skeptical about the impacts of this 
initiative on their own individual cases or fearful that 
essential resources might be deviated from search 
efforts. The experts’ response was usually to refer to 
the experience of transitional justice in other coun-
tries, where truth commissions had led the way for 
reparation policies and judicial practices (Interview 
with Edgar Cortés, IMDHD, Mexico City, April 2019).
This tension is especially striking considering that the 
consolidation of a right to truth in the inter-American 
human rights system was closely linked to the phenom-
enon of forced disappearance. This right first manifested 
itself in the region with the emergence of states’ obli-
gation to promote “an effective search to establish the 
whereabouts of forcibly disappeared victims, in order 
to establish the truth of what happened”; it was thus 
primarily “a right pertaining to relatives of victims of 
forced disappearance” (IACHR 2014, paragraph 10-11). 
Over time, however, the right to truth was increasingly 
consolidated around two dimensions: the right of victims 
and their family members; and the right of society as a 
whole “to know the truth about past events, as well as 
the motives and circumstances in which aberrant crimes 
came to be committed, in order to prevent the recur-
rence of such acts in the future” (IACHR 2014, paragraph 
15). While the first dimension is more often handled 
through search mechanisms devoted to finding the 
forcibly disappeared, the second, became increasingly 
associated with independent truth commissions dedi-
cated to the identification of patterns and causes amidst 
massive human rights violations. This is where the idea 
of identifying legacies over time finds its meaning.
In other words, important tensions arise from the coex-
istence between conceptions of impunity as a problem 
to be handled on a case-by-case basis, or through a 
more “holistic” approach, as often advocated in the 
field of transitional justice. This tension is also reflected 
on debates regarding the centrality of past legacies in 
confronting present human rights violations, impacting 
support for proposals such as the creation of a truth 
commission as well as debates about its temporal scope. 
In the next section, we will look at another challenge 
that arises from efforts for producing truth regarding 
present patterns of human rights violations: the need to 
account for the entanglement among the many legacies 
that can be drawn between past and present experienc-
es of violence.
Entangled Legacies: Connecting Present State 
Violence to Multiple Pasts in Rio de Janeiro’s 
Sub Commission of Truth in Democracy
In May 2012, a National Truth Commission was created in 
Brazil in order to investigate serious human rights viola-
tions occurred between the constitutions of 1946 and 1988, 
but mainly focused on the country’s period of military 
dictatorship (1964-1985). Its final report, published in 2014, 
acknowledged crimes of torture, summary execution, 
arbitrary detention and concealment of bodies, mainly 
perpetrated by state agents against members of opposi-
tionist armed groups or university students; thus, victims 
tended to be young, white and middle-class. Violations 
against other sections of the population which did not meet 
the strict criteria of “political victims,” such as peasants, 
indigenous peoples and black populations living in the 
peripheries of large cities, were mostly relegated to the 
second volume of the report, composed of texts which 
only represented the position of their authors, as opposed 
to the official first and third volumes (Pedretti 2017).
In the years that followed the creation of the National 
Truth Commission, over a hundred subnational com-
missions were created across the country. Some of 
them were linked to state and city governments and 
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legislatures, while others were outside the state realm; 
they were created by trade unions, universities, and 
professional associations; and they often sought to 
overcome limitations attributed to the National Truth 
Commission. This proliferation, referred to by Cristina 
Buarque de Hollanda as “commissionism,” has largely 
stemmed from the struggle for memory, truth, and 
justice by victims of the Brazilian military dictatorship 
and their family members, and members of these sub-
national truth commissions have often referred to the 
continuities revealed by violations committed by state 
agents in the present. As put by a commissioner in the 
State of Rio de Janeiro Commission: how could people 
not connect “the police who kills inside a UPP and the 
police who used to kill inside a DOI/CODI?” (Buarque de 
Hollanda 2018, 7).2
While the multiplication of commissions devoted to 
violations committed in the dictatorship has since 
decelerated, this process has also influenced the emer-
gence of new mechanisms with a mandate devoted to 
violations committed after the country’s “democrati-
zation.” This has been the case of the Sub commission 
of Truth in Democracy “Mothers of Acari,” created in 
December 2015 by the Commission for the Defense of 
Human Rights and Citizenship situated in Rio de Janeiro 
State Legislature (CDDHC/ALERJ). Initially composed of 
three researchers with a 3-year mandate, the Truth Sub 
commission aimed to gather, systematize, and analyze 
information regarding the serious violations of human 
rights committed by state agents and related actors, 
between 1988 and 2018, in the State of Rio de Janeiro. 
As the Sub commission later declared in its final report, 
the initiative was considered innovative due to the 
decision to analyze the same historical period in which 
it was implemented, rather than focusing on the past 
(Comissão de Direitos Humanos da Alerj 2018a, 11).
On the one hand, the creation of the Sub commission 
was inspired by the experiences of the Brazilian Nation-
al Truth Commission and of the Truth Commission 
of the State of Rio de Janeiro (CEV-Rio), both of them 
focused on the dictatorship period. Another crucial 
inspiration was the Truth Commission in Democracy, 
Mothers of May, established in the same year in the 
Legislature of São Paulo with a similar mandate as that 
of Rio’s Sub commission, but with that state as its spatial 
scope (Comissão de Direitos Humanos da Alerj 2018a, 
11). On the other hand, the Sub commission was also the 
result of the mobilization of human rights movements 
and organizations which resist institutional violence, 
2 The UPPs (Pacifying Police Units) are public security polices 
implemented in the state of Rio de Janeiro in 2008. The DOI/
CODI, or Department of Information Operations - Center for 
Internal Defense Operations, was a police unit which was 
central to intelligence and repression activities during the 
Brazilian dictatorship.
including movements based in Rio’s favelas, alongside 
a number of researchers and activists.3
As mentioned in the first section of this article, handling 
the legacies that participate in the composition of pres-
ent patterns of human rights violations can require an 
awareness of the connections between the present and 
various contexts in the past. In efforts to make sense 
of present violence, these “legacies” are mobilized as 
threads over time, emphasizing different “connections” 
as causal factors to be transformed. In the context of 
the Sub commission of Truth in Democracy “Mothers 
of Acari,” the entanglement between different legacies 
was evident from its start. After all, the Sub commission 
had to make sense of the violence perpetrated by state 
agents “in Democracy”; that is, after an official process 
of democratization. However, the present patterns of 
state violence it sought to handle were not necessarily 
compatible with the temporality of dictatorship and 
democratization, since the violent presence of state 
agents in marginalized areas such as Acari was part of a 
much longer history.
Mothers of Acari
On July 26, 1990, eleven people, most of whom were 
teenagers from the Acari favela in Rio de Janeiro, went 
to the nearby city of Magé for a short vacation.4 Around 
midnight on that same day, a group of armed men who 
presented themselves as police officers broke into the 
house, asking whether there was jewelry or money 
on the premises. The entire group was then put into 
two vehicles and taken to an uncertain location. None 
of them were ever seen again (Comissão de Direitos 
Humanos da Alerj 2018c).
The cars were found days later, burnt and with traces of 
blood. The main suspects were death squads from that 
region, which included military police officers in their 
ranks, according to the accounts of many witnesses. 
However, after decades of troubled and inconclusive 
investigations by Brazilian authorities, no suspects 
have been held responsible for the massacre, and the 
victims’ whereabouts remain unknown.
3 The following organizations are mentioned: Rede de Comuni-
dades e Movimentos Contra a Violência, Fórum de Juventudes 
do Rio de Janeiro, Fórum Social de Manguinhos, Instituto 
Brasileiro de Análises Sociais e Econômicas (IBASE), Instituto 
de Estudos da Religião (ISER), Coletivo Olga Benário, CEV-Rio 
and Justiça Global.
4 Their names and ages were: Antônio Carlos da Silva, 17; Cristiane 
Souza Leite, 16; Édio do Nascimento, 41; Edson de Souza, 17; 
Hudson de Souza, 16; Luiz Carlos Vasconcelos de Deus, 31; Luiz 
Henrique da Silva Euzébio, 18; Moisés dos Santos Cruz, 27; Rosana 
de Souza Santos, 18; Viviane Rocha da Silva, 14; and Wallace do 
Nascimento, 17.
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The case became known as the “Acari massacre” (Chacina 
de Acari), and the struggle of the victims’ mothers led to 
the birth of a movement of victims of state violence and 
their family members, called “Mothers of Acari” (Mães 
de Acari). Having become a reference for the struggle 
for truth and justice, most of those mothers have died 
without ever getting an answer on what happened to 
their children. One of them, Edméia da Silva Euzébio, 
was murdered on an afternoon in 1993, in the parking lot 
of a crowded subway station. Later, investigations sug-
gested that she had just obtained important information 
that might help her find the body of her disappeared son 
(Anistia Internacional 2018).
The Acari massacre is also emblematic in terms of the 
temporal continuities expressed by the experience of 
death squads in Rio. As was later discussed in the first 
volume of the Sub commission’s final report, these 
actors can be traced back at least to 1958, when a group 
of police officers —some of whom had participated in 
political repression during a previous authoritarian gov-
ernment— was created with a license to “clean the city” 
by executing thieves, homeless persons, prostitutes, 
and other marginalized groups. During the dictatorship, 
death squads deepened their informal role as controllers 
of urban criminality in peripheral regions of the state 
(Comissão de Direitos Humanos da Alerj 2018b), although 
their victims —mostly black young peripheral men— are 
not generally framed as victims of dictatorship.
Moreover, as mentioned in the previous section, the 
phenomenon of forced disappearance is widespread 
in Latin America, and victims’ mothers have played a 
central role in the consolidation of a “right to the truth” 
in the region. However, while much of this framework 
has been developed in relation to violations committed 
against political opponents, contexts in which violations 
are perpetrated by state agents —whether in death 
squads or on duty— against marginalized communities 
pose additional challenges for the struggle of family 
members for truth and justice. The mothers also face 
the stigmatization associated with their social condi-
tion, as expressed by one of the Mothers of Acari:
A few days ago, we heard Col. Larangeira, who at 
the time of the crime commanded the 9th BPM 
(Rocha Miranda) [and had been accused of leading 
a death squad involved in the massacre], tell us that 
we could not be called “Mothers of Acari” because 
we were comparing ourselves to the Mothers of 
May. According to him, we are the mothers of 11 
criminals, while the Mothers of May were moth-
ers of people who died fighting for democracy in 
Argentina. He suggested that we are linked to drug 
trafficking, which is untrue. My life is an open book. 
(Araújo 2007, 53-54)
This distinction in the legitimacy often attributed to 
victims’ mothers suggests the need to account for the 
different legacies that constitute patterns of human rights 
violations committed by state agents “in democracy,” as 
will be further explored below. Going beyond an analysis 
of particular practices that remain from times of dicta-
torship, one must also take into account the structural 
continuities that enable the continuous targeting of 
these communities before, during and after times that 
are deemed “exceptional.”
Entangled Legacies in Democracy
Many challenges arise from the differences between a 
transitional justice narrative —including the framing of 
present violence as an indicator of a failed transitional jus-
tice— and the repertories of mobilization associated with 
the struggles against structural racism in the country. 
After all, as seen above, the Sub commission was created 
at a moment of proliferation of subnational truth com-
missions, which were connected by certain perspectives 
on the place of the past dictatorship in the composition of 
present violence; but it also stemmed from the struggles 
of peripheral communities against state repression as it 
has long been perpetrated against black bodies.
During 2016, a number of open meetings were held, 
where researchers, victims’ movements and human rights 
activists collectively discussed the methodology of the 
Sub commission. At one of these meetings, participants 
discussed the status of the Acari case  as part of a broader 
structure of impunity, rather than an isolated event; as 
argued by one participant, “in Acari, this case is constantly 
reenacted and refueled. We need to think of how this 
case reenacts issues that we experience all the time. It 
is not just Acari, it happens every day” (Subcomissão da 
Verdade na Democracia 2016, [n. p.]).
These issues would later be reflected in the Sub com-
mission’s final report, published in 2018. The executive 
summary of the final report begins with a question: 
“Why a truth commission in democracy?” The answer 
starts with an account of the transitional justice pro-
cesses at the end of military dictatorships in Latin 
America in the mid-1980s, mainly characterized by 
memory and truth initiatives undertaken much later. 
The incomplete character of this transition is, then, 
connected in the report, to present patterns of state 
violence against marginalized communities: “The guar-
antee of the right to memory and truth constitutes, 
thus, an attempt to conclude the process of redemoc-
ratization in Brazil, confronting the institutional racism 
that has never been after overcome” (Comissão de Dire-
itos Humanos da Alerj 2018a, 9).
Thus, while reproducing the narrative of an incomplete 
transition as a source of present violence, the report also 
hints at the entanglement between this “authoritarian 
legacy” and the historical effects and origins of structural 
racism in Brazil. It also notes that:
28 D O S S I E R
rev.estud.soc. No. 73 • julio-septiembre • Pp. 18-30 • ISSN 0123-885X • e-ISSN 1900-5180 · https://doi.org/10.7440/res73.2020.02
The systematic violence of the state against, mainly, 
the black and poor population reveals that, 30 years 
after the redemocratization of the Brazilian state, 
the legacy of dictatorship —and of historical periods 
which start with the slavery of black women and 
men— remains in police and military structures, as 
well as in criminal justice policies. It is clear that, 
for certain social groups, the state of exception has 
never ceased to exist, which allows us to argue that 
nowadays there are highly structured processes of 
repression and criminalization of poverty and of black 
people even during the democratic regime. (Comissão 
de Direitos Humanos da Alerj 2018a, 10)
When asked about how they handled this entanglement 
in their research process, Noelle Resende —who coor-
dinated the line of research on torture and spaces of 
deprivation of liberty— explained that “the issue of the 
violence of the past is highly present both in a struc-
tural analysis of institutional racism, and in an analysis 
of finer continuities, of specific actors and dynamics” 
(Interview with Noelle Resende, Former researcher at 
the Sub commission of Truth in Democracy “Mothers 
of Acari,” Rio de Janeiro, December 2019). According 
to Resende, while the issue of institutional racism as a 
legacy of slavery was mostly handled as part of a cru-
cial historical background for the analysis, there were 
specific practices that were traced back to the times of 
dictatorship, or even before, such as the emergence of 
death squads, as previously mentioned in this section.
In sum, while the Sub commission’s final report repro-
duces the narrative that frames present forms of state 
violence as a legacy of dictatorship we have failed to 
properly overcome, this narrative is made more com-
plex by the constant reference to other “legacies” that 
are central to present human rights violations perpe-
trated in the State of Rio de Janeiro. It is not surprising, 
then, that although the creation of the Sub commission 
was intrinsically connected to a trend of “commission-
ism” in Brazil, when asked to present their findings at a 
public audience in December 2018, the Sub commission’s 
researchers chose to emphasize the role of structural 
racism as the main explanation for present patterns 
of summary executions, torture, deprivation of liberty, 
and forced disappearance in the State of Rio de Janeiro.
Final Considerations
In this article, we have gone over stories that illustrate 
the mobilization of a “failed transition” narrative, where 
present patterns of human rights violations perpetrated 
by state agents in “wars against crime” are connected to 
those of past “dirty wars.” As we have seen, important 
tensions emerge from that narrative, as there are often 
other “legacies” that are equally crucial when it comes 
to making sense of present forms of state violence. 
Claiming that “dealing with the past” is a condition for 
transforming present structures of violence authorizes 
particular solutions, which include the creation of tran-
sitional justice mechanisms such as truth commissions 
and reparations programs.
Moreover, the claim that present forms of organized 
violence, especially when perpetrated by state agents in 
“wars on crime,” are the expression of persisting lega-
cies of past political violence tends to emphasize some 
“causes” over others —for instance, the role of militarized 
apparatuses developed for counterinsurgency purposes, 
or the weakness of judicial systems, over other sets of 
structural causes such as poverty and inequality. Finally, 
in this reading, the positive transformation of organized 
violence is usually framed as “non-repetition”; which, 
while favoring a political agenda of radical transforma-
tion, may assume the need for a clear end of violations 
in contexts where only gradual change is attainable in 
the short-term.
Crucially, however, the stories discussed above tell 
us of how these efforts to look at present patterns of 
human rights violations through the lens of transition-
al justice also provide an opportunity to reinvigorate 
that field of practice and expertise itself, fostering a 
more nuanced understanding of possible “transitions” 
and of the entanglements between agency and struc-
ture in the (re)production of violence. Such efforts and 
mechanisms can disturb the distinction between “past” 
and “future,” while retaining the conception of the 
present as a space of possible change.
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